



Objectives: Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a form of biotechnological 
surgery which has had considerable success for the motor improvement of 
Parkinson’s disease and related disorders. Paradoxically, this observed motor 
improvement is not matched with improved psychosocial adjustment. This 
study contributes to a small but growing body of research aiming to 
understand this paradox.  We conclude by discussing these aspects from a 
phenomenological and health psychology understanding of decision-making, 
human affectivity and embodiment. 
Design: A hermeneutic phenomenological case study. 
Methods: Semi-structured interviews with one woman with Parkinson’s 
disease were carried out paying particular attention to (a) how the decision to 
have the procedure was made and (b) the affective experience in the time 
periods immediately prior to the procedure, shortly after and one month later.  
Results: The thematic structure derived from the hermeneutic 
phenomenological analysis comprises the following experiential aspects: 
Making the decision: ‘I was feeling rather at a dead end with my Parkinson’s’; 
Shifting emotions and feelings: ‘Terrified, excited, disappointed, overjoyed’; 
Embodied meaning: ‘This extraordinary procedure where they were going to 
drill holes in my head’. 
Conclusions: This research has elucidated the complexity of decision–
making, the emotional landscape and specific bodily nature of the experience 
of DBS. It has suggested implications for practice informed by both existential-




Deep brain stimulation (DBS) is a new form of biotechnological surgery and it 
is important to understand patients’ experience of it; many of us are living 
longer lives and as biotechnology advances what we think, feel and do about 
these matters carries existential import.  
 
DBS and Parkinson’s disease 
There is considerable evidence of the success of DBS in the alleviation of the 
motor symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. However, clinicians do not always 
observe a corresponding improvement in psychosocial aspects and a growing 
body of research addresses this paradox. (Agid, Schüpbach, Gargiulo, Mallet, 
Houeto, Behar et al., 2006; Hariz, Limousin, Tisch, Jahanshahi & Fjellman-
Wiklund, 2011; Schüpbach, Gargiulo, Welter, Mallet, Béhar, Houeto et 
al.2006; Schüpbach & Agid, 2008). Common to this research is its use of 
qualitative methodologies to gain insight into the patients’ perspective – what 
matters to them. The value of these approaches is particularly pertinent with 
neurodegenerative disorders like Parkinson’s disease because they are 
defined by heterogeneity with the patient often perceived as a “law unto 
himself” (Stern, 1990). 
 
DBS is offered when symptoms cannot be controlled with medication or drug 
induced side effects become too severe. Specific brain structures are targeted 
in order to reversibly modify functional brain circuits. This involves the 
placement of electrodes using computerized stereotactic imaging techniques 
which are connected to thin insulated leads and linked to a neurostimulator, a 
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device similar to a pacemaker, which is implanted under the skin in the chest 
area (Okun et al, 2007). When the stimulator is switched on, electrical 
impulses are produced which are sent to the brain to stop or reduce the 
signals that produce Parkinson’s disease.   
 
At present, research is limited to life post-DBS and findings demonstrate that 
DBS offers both possibilities and challenges for living. Although many people 
experience increased confidence due to motor success, their “new life” brings 
concerns about stimulator dependency and side effects (Hariz et al, 2011). 
Agid et al (2006) assessed quality of life via interviews with 29 individuals and 
findings conformed to the emerging picture of marked motor improvement 
contrasted with poor psychosocial adjustment. How people incorporate their 
newfound health poses problems for work, marital and social life and sense of 
self, alongside body image concerns due to the presence of the stimulator. 
Although a direct role for stimulation is possible, they argued a more likely 
explanation is experiencing problems of ‘reintegration’. 
 
A related explanation is that treatment using new biotechnology is a disruptive 
biographical experience. Prior to DBS, patients managed the disease in ways 
that had become habitual and embedded in their daily lives. Post-DBS these 
strategies are no longer needed. Some people experienced a loss of control 
which permeates all aspects of their lives (Gisquet, 2008). Initial elation over 
improved motor abilities is replaced with feelings of bodily alienation and their 
lives lose meaning. One individual reported, “Before stimulation, every day 
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was a fight against the illness. Now, my life seems empty without real stake” 
(Gisquet, 2008, p. 1849).   
 
The prior beliefs and thoughts of individuals considering DBS play a role in 
decision-making, coping strategies and adjustment processes. An interview 
study aimed at eliciting the views of healthcare providers concluded that 
managing patients’ hopes and expectations was complex, further complicated 
by media reporting of ‘miracle cures’ (Bell et al, 2011). To counter unrealistic 
beliefs, family and social support networks are vital for the provision of good 
psychological care and psychosocial education. Clinicians should aim to be 
open and transparent, informing patients and families not only about the 
potential for increased mobility but the psychosocial issues outlined above. As 
the research stands, it seems to be a case of “the doctor is happy, the patient 
less so.” (Agid et al, 2006, p. 410).  
 
The current picture is one of a mismatch between an improved motor state 
and an experienced world different from the one prior to surgery. This 
situation is comparable to that of a diagnosis of Parkinson’s, a time that 
represents biomedical coherence for the clinician, whilst for the person 
diagnosed, it is one of experiential incoherence (Pinder, 1992). 
 
This study aims to contribute to a way of doing health science and to a form of 
health care which places the person at its centre (Williams & Grant, 1998); 
one that enables people to discuss and make choices in a meaningful way, 
and that encourages health care professionals to listen to the particular 
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concerns of individuals. Insight into what matters for the person contributes to 
caring practices which are multidimensional embracing a humanizing and 
technological focus (Todres, Galvin & Dahlberg, 2007).  
 
The value of an idiographic phenomenological psychology case study 
 
Being idiographic 
Ashworth and Greasley (2016) describe an idiographic sensibility recognizing 
the “realization of the inescapability of the personal lifeworld” (p.572). 
Robinson (2011) argues that being idiographic is an objective which seeks to 
describe and explain singular events and things in the dynamic context in 
which they occur. Idiographic and nomothetic methods complement each 
other and both are forms of evidence-based knowledge (Runyan, 1983). 
 
The value of the idiographic is seen in the move to personalized medicine and 
also methodologically in approaches ranging from experience sampling 
methods (Conner, Tennen, Fleeson & Feldman Barrett, 2009); contemporary 
idiographic science (Molenaar, 2004; Molenaar & Valsiner, 2008); 
phenomenological qualitative research (Finlay & Molano-Fisher, 2008; Spiers 
& Smith, 2016) and theoretical discussions of the relationship between the 
idiographic/nomothetic dyad (Barlow & Nock, 2009; Robinson, 2011; 
Salvatore & Valsiner, 2010).  
 
The case study 
Nietzsche (1974) said that “One should not wish to divest existence of its rich 
ambiguity” (pp. 335, § 373). Case study research aims to provide concrete 
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contextual knowledge in the form of exemplars which retain and convey the 
complexity and nuance of real life. Case study research has been described 
extensively (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003) with Stake proposing 
that a case might be descriptive, intrinsic or instrumental in its aim. Cases can 
describe a phenomenon in the context in which it happens. Intrinsic cases are 
undertaken when the case itself, in all its ordinariness, is of interest; the 
instrumental case takes what has been learned about one case and examines 
other similar cases in light of that knowledge. This case study straddles all 
three approaches. It provides detailed research-based descriptions of the 
DBS experience and it has intrinsic interest. We suggest it has instrumental 
value because the findings can be ‘transferred to’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1989) or 
‘recontextualised’ (Morse, 1994). We are guided by the claim that “formal 
generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas 
‘the force of example’ is underestimated” (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 228). 
 
The usefulness of case study research is recognised in the health sciences 
particularly in the study of dementia (Hellström, Nolan & Lundh, 2005; 
Kitwood, 1997). It is argued that the approach provides researchers with a 
flexible and viable tool for developing and evaluating theory, interventions and 
treatment programmes (Baxter & Jack, 2008). 
 
 Phenomenological psychology 
The focus of phenomenological psychology is lived experience, how 
individuals experience events, processes and other aspects of their life (see 
Blinded, in press; Finlay, 2009 and Langdridge, 2007 for a detailed 
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discussion). Typically, researchers begin with individual narratives of the 
phenomenon and from these aim to distil an understanding which elucidates, 
more broadly, the nature of human being/living. As such, phenomenology has 
been described as an approach which “begins with the idiographic and moves 
towards the nomothetic” (Churchill, 2014: 4). 
 
Halling (2008) proposes three levels of analysis to bring about this move: 
researchers examine and reflect upon the specific experience (say, living with 
Parkinson’s disease); with several descriptions of this experience, 
researchers scrutinize them for shared aspects which say something about 
the nature of the experience more generally (such as unwanted feelings of 
dependency on family and bodily changes which limit activities); finally, in a 
more philosophical and fundamental vein, they might ask how the possibility 
of such feelings and change even exist and what they say about the nature of 
human being (that human beings are relational and embodied creatures). 
Willig (2015) has identified a tension when researchers do not wish to (or their 
data demands they not do so) lose sight of individual experience, yet want to 
make inferences which have more universal validity. Her solution was to ask 
focused process and meaning questions of each individual account giving rise 
to a more fundamental and shared significance. Similarly, Garza (2011) has 
proposed developing an idiographic thematic narrative which might prepare 
“the ground for a comparative or general level of analysis” (Garza, 2011:50). 
We suggest addressing this tension on a case-by-case basis, being open and 
attentive to ones’ engagement with the data and what it is telling us. This 
tension applies to both single- and cumulative-cases and our modest aim here 
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is to offer some inferences for readers to consider if they are reasonable, 
recognizable and significant. 
 
Methods 
This is a hermeneutic-phenomenological exploration of the experience of 
undergoing DBS. The first author is an experienced phenomenological 
researcher whilst the second author is a specialist nurse in movement 
disorder research with experience in conducting experiential interviews. 
Ethical approval was given by the Department of Psychological Sciences, 
Birkbeck University of London. 
 
The study contributes to the emerging picture of the psychosocial 
consequences of DBS with a detailed focus on (a) how the decision to have 
the procedure is made and (b) the affective experience in the time periods 
immediately prior to the procedure, shortly after and one month later. As far 
as we are aware, these particular aspects and temporal dimensions have not 
been addressed previously. 
 
Participant and data collection 
Katherine (a pseudonym), a 72-year-old woman was diagnosed with young 
onset Parkinson’s disease thirty years ago and she recently underwent 
bilateral posteroventral pallidal DBS. Data were collected through semi-
structured interviews by the second author in Katherine’s home where she 
lived alone. Katherine was interviewed three times: 3 weeks prior to the 
procedure, 4 weeks post procedure and a final time at 12 weeks.  
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Interview schedules were developed for each time period but as is usual in 
phenomenological research, the schedule was used as a guide and Katherine 
was encouraged to introduce topics which were relevant for her. In practice, 
this might mean abandoning, at least partially, prepared questions and 
allowing the participant to set the parameters for what is important 
experientially. Table 1 shows sample questions for each interview including 
ancillaries and prompts designed to elicit further detail and reflection. All 
interviews focused on how Katherine was thinking and feeling at the time as 
well as encouraging more reflective sense making.  
 
(insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Each interview lasted 60-90 minutes and provided 5.25 hours of data in total. 
Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed verbatim and anonymized.  
 
Each interview was analyzed separately before being treated as a single data 
set which was subjected to further analysis in order to examine change across 
the three time periods. Analytic procedure included several stages: multiple 
readings to aid ‘dwelling’ in the experience, becoming aware of and reflecting 
on the researchers’ assumptions and preconceptions so that the focus 
remained on what Katherine said; identification of thematic moments where 
moments are understood as presenting “an “aspect” or “face” of the 
phenomenon under investigation – a sort of touchstone moment by which the 
rest of the data can be rendered sensible from a particular vantage point” 
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(Garza, 2004). The identified moments were marked in boldface type and 
remained embedded in the interview text; moments were copied and pasted 
into a separate document and organized into thematic groups which 
represented initial understandings of “coherent threads of meaning” (Garza, 
2011, p. 47). Themes represent moments which fit together from the 
perspective of the researcher. Transformation involves a shift from the facts of 
‘what happened’ to possible immanent meanings (Wertz, 1985). The end 
result is a thematic structure which has moved from “the ‘given facts’ (the data 
as presented) to ‘intended meanings’ (the data as understood by the 
researcher)” (Churchill, 2014:10). Themes are both data-driven and 
constituted out of a dialogue between participant and researcher which 
inevitably partly reflect the researcher’s perspective and focus.  
 
Findings 
The thematic structure comprises three experiential aspects: Making the 
decision, shifting emotions and feelings and thoughts about DBS and 
embodied meaning. Numbers in parentheses refer to the interview the extract 
is drawn from. 
 
Making the decision: “I was feeling rather at a dead end with my Parkinson’s” 
Katherine described how being asked to consider DBS cast her Parkinson’s in 
a different light: 
 
I would say I was feeling rather at a dead end with my Parkinson’s I felt 
that I was getting worse and nothing seemed to be helping very much. I 
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think I was complaining probably and he [Katherine’s consultant] 
suddenly introduced this idea of deep brain stimulation and because he 
introduced it, because he was so conservative about operations and 
new treatments I took it very seriously. (1) 
 
Katherine’s use of the phrase “my Parkinson’s” is intimate and hints at the 
relationship between illness and sense of self. “Dead end” evokes the 
metaphor of illness-as-journey, one which has stalled and reached an 
impasse and DBS offers the possibility of breaking out of it. However, there is 
a more painful interpretation, that of having reached the end of life. Katherine 
is faced with being-towards-death, the awareness that her life is finite. As 
such, DBS was something weighty and to be given careful consideration. 
 
Katherine felt fearful and alarmed – the disease she had lived with for over 
thirty years now required her to consider a “radical’ form of surgery which 
suggested that her Parkinson’s had assumed a more threatening status: 
 
I felt that I was worse and it made me somewhat in awe of my 
Parkinson’s that it was considered by him of all people to need an 
operation so I was a bit alarmed as well as somewhat frightened of the 
idea. (1) 
 
DBS had confronted Katherine with death, something she returned to 
frequently saying, “I feel my body is up against me…I’m fated to die”.  
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Although not unusual for ideas of death and dying to be foregrounded when 
facing surgery, their presence indicates the relevance of a social network and 
professional counseling to help patients confront their fears. Katherine talked 
explicitly about the value of taking part in this study because she had a 
“clearer sense” and felt “lighter”, having had the opportunity to talk through 
issues which had helped clarify for her “certain sorts of muddy areas in my 
brain”. 
 
Although clinicians encourage patients to discuss decisions with family and 
friends this is rarely straightforward in the complex web of familial 
relationships. Katherine has a supportive family but their “slightly horrified” 
reactions meant that rather than sharing her own fears and concerns, she 
spent time reassuring them: 
 
Yes, I immediately told the children that this had been proposed as 
something to look into and they were all slightly horrified and most 
people’s reaction has been one of slight horror so I’ve been spending 
my time reassuring them rather against my feeling because I don’t feel 
that reassured myself but it’s better that then have them with their eyes 
like saucers saying how could you do such a thing? (1) 
 
Katherine’s fears and her own horror were reflected back to her and as a 
result she decided to keep them to herself:  
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I want them to know about it but I don’t want them worrying more than 
necessary, it’s hard to take comfort from them because I’m trying to 
protect them so I can’t go to them and say I feel terribly weak and 
frightened because that’s too much for them to take. (1) 
 
Katherine does not have a husband and her wish to protect her children as 
well as herself from peoples’ reaction to DBS is likely to have left her feeling 
alone.  
 
Thinking about dying was part of Katherine’s decision-making and it 
fluctuated:  
 
Dr X said he hasn’t had anybody who hasn’t been helped a bit which is 
enough for me and I know there’s a risk in having an operation and I 
think secretly I think I’ll die I don’t really, I don’t know what I think. (1) 
 
It is, it’s very heavy then there’s the brighter side of me that thinks don’t 
make such a fuss all these people have had it people are queuing up to 
have it, it can’t be that dangerous. (1)   
 
Katherine knew the decision was hers to make but what she says suggests 
bewilderment and confusion. A more existential reading might say that not 
knowing what to think is a way of avoiding feelings of vulnerability and 




Katherine was clear that she did not simply want ‘facts’ to evaluate, she 
wanted to discuss her fears and concerns and receive a human reassuring 
response. She said of her consultant, “I was looking for confidence and he 
didn’t give it. He didn’t not give it but he didn’t give it” and reading about the 
DBS experience of others was helpful. Several times she said how she would 
have liked the opportunity to talk to people who had had DBS.  
 
Other worries included personality change and visible signs of surgery. 
Katherine described a man who had undergone the procedure:  
 
[He had] two sort of things like horns growing out of his head, he looks 
awful, it’s so frightening and that’s obviously where they put the 
electrodes in he looks like a young deer who’s growing horns. (1) 
 
Katherine’s sense making is imbued with fear about how the procedure might 
change her appearance which in turn might affect self-perceptions as well as 
those from others.  These concerns contrasted sharply with her hopes for a 
successful outcome. The possibility of a reduction in her exhausting and 
embarrassing tremor encouraged Katherine to be “brave”, imagining a 
different life that was tremor free and “wonderful.”  
 
Finally, Katherine’s perceptions of the surgical team influenced her decision: 
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He really wanted to find out what I felt about what he was telling me 
because most surgeons are very impersonal and rather chilling. (1) 
 
The team appeared to work well together without “a feeling of competitiveness 
between the different levels of authority” which engendered feelings of trust 
and security in Katherine; she was comforted by the humanity of the surgeon. 
This particular experience was in contrast to other times when surgeons had 
been “chilling” and “impersonal”. These perceptions suggest that feelings of 
reassurance and safety which are so important to decision-making are, at 
least sometimes, absent from surgeon-patient interactions. 
 
Shifting emotions and feelings: “Terrified”, “Excited”, “Disappointed”, 
“Overjoyed” 
 
Katherine’s interviews reveal a background orientation of fluctuating emotions, 
moods and feelings. Indeed, one of the most striking things the analysis 
shows is the complexity and range of emotional states experienced. 
Fearfulness dominated and manifested itself in a number of ways: fear about 
her body afterwards, “I’m worried about getting water in the holes in my head” 
and fear about motor improvement being temporary, “I’m frightened of the rest 
of Parkinson’s engulfing me”. Being engulfed is a powerful image that 
conveys Katherine’s sense of the disease as insidious, a bodily trespasser 
that will eventually swallow her up. This fearfulness intermingled with other 
feelings and Katherine moved from relief, acceptance and finally excitement 
before the operation through to failure, disappointment and anger afterwards.  
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Unsurprisingly, Katherine felt relief when she went into hospital for the 
procedure: 
 
It was a relief to be in and have it happening because I knew I wanted 
to do it I knew it, equally strongly I was terrified of it but I was there now 
and there was nothing for it but to get on and it was a relief instead of 
waiting instead of thinking about it I was not waiting and thinking about 
it which was easier. (2) 
 
This shift from fearfulness to relief might signify a relinquishing of control or 
that Katherine had more actively oriented herself towards acceptance. She 
moved between ‘giving up’ and a more active acceptance and it seems more 
likely that our orientations towards the world contain both these elements: 
  
I stopped feeling apprehensive I sort of gave up I decided to just let it 
go. I had faith in the team who were looking after me and I felt that was 
enough and I wasn’t likely to die though I might and I sort of came to 
terms with that. (2) 
 
Those of us who have had operations or had loved ones and friends undergo 
them will recognize this relinquishing of control, this placing of trust in others 
and an acknowledgment that however unlikely, dying is a possibility. 
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Relief and acceptance is only part of the story; Katherine described it as also 
“unreal” and “exciting”: 
 
It was definitely quite exciting and they seemed to know what they 
were doing and it was quite a relief to be taken over, what else did they 
do to me oh yes they scrubbed me down with red soap like cleaning a 
horse after a race and I felt very curious and they put stuff on my hair 
though they promised me they wouldn’t shave my head. (2) 
 
I felt like I was being challenged in some way and I must rise to it and 
that was quite exciting, it was quite invigorating after all the waiting. 
…I’d been sitting thinking about it and suddenly there it was large as 
life and actually frankly terrifying but also quite exhilarating. (2) 
 
Feelings of exhilaration, invigoration and rising to the challenge seem to 
provide further evidence that Katherine had actively taken a more positive 
orientation toward the surgery. Also worth noting is that despite Katherine’s 
relief that the procedure was going to happen, she was unsure about whether 
or not her head would be shaved suggesting an element of doubt and lack of 
trust over what she had been told.  
 
Post DBS, Katherine’s emotional landscape changed again and was coloured 
with feelings of failure, disappointment and anger. She could not discern the 
“dramatic improvement” hoped for and she felt “puzzled and rather dismayed” 
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and that somehow, she had failed the surgical team as well as family and 
friends: 
 
I felt I’d failed, the fact that I wasn’t immediately dramatically different 
made me feel I’d failed, I had a huge sense of failure. (2) 
 
Katherine was not only disappointed that the surgery has not worked she was 
disappointed in herself. Her body had let her down and she was not a 
successful patient.  
 
Over time, Katherine began to notice improvement but it took the familiar 
surroundings of her home to convince her of it:  
 
I left the hospital convinced that it hadn’t worked or convinced that it 
had only worked in a way that was so marginal that the doctors were 
pretending to be pleased with me and it was only when I got home that 
I realized how much better I was. (2) 
 
This realization was accompanied by feelings of “being overjoyed”, “grateful” 
and “happy”, all of which left Katherine exhausted. Simultaneously, she 
experienced abandonment expressed as being “slightly cast adrift” as she 
struggled to get an appointment to discuss her “new body”: 
 
I feel I went through this extraordinary ordeal and I’m owed a certain 
care and not to be able to get hold of them is very frustrating…one 
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desperately wants support all the time, I mean in a way I’ve been given 
lots of support but I need more, I feel frightened. (3) 
 
Once more, the world was a fearful place for Katherine. Although the surgery 
had been successful she felt in a sort of limbo – her body altered and she 
faced the challenge of how to live with the changes. The procedure had given 
rise to considerable emotional fragility indicating the need for psychological 
support at all stages. 
 
Embodied meaning: “This extraordinary procedure where they were going to 
drill holes in my head” 
 
Katherine described the procedure of DBS as “odd”, “spectacular”, “strange” 
and “mysterious” and that other peoples’ reactions were ones of “horror”; it 
was alien, the stuff of horror movies and novels: 
 
I feel quite squeamish. I imagine that I will lie there asleep then they 
will get a drill and make a hole in my head on one side and then the 
other side and then they’ll stick iron things into me and then my heart 
will stop beating and I’ll be dead. (1) 
 
Although Katherine knew that the procedure required great skill and precision, 
she imagined it as a brutal assault on her body ending with her death. 
Postoperatively, her sense of her body was foreign to her:  
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It’s beginning to sink in literally and metaphorically what’s happened to 
me. I think in the beginning I was so relieved not to be dead and so 
relieved I had a good result that I didn’t really focus on the reality of 
having two electrodes in my brain and a battery in my chest, to be 
honest when you mention it I feel quite frightened. (3) 
 
Attempts to accept her changed body involved imagining what this new body 
would be like. Although she dismissed her imaginings, they represented 
attempts to normalize DBS and for it to become part of her narrative:  
 
I imagine that there’s one on each side, they told me that they go in like 
hard spaghetti and then they soften like cooked spaghetti once they’re 
in so they’re quite benign they’re not like having a metal thing in your 
head and they’ve got 4 claws and these claws sort of cling to the 
affected area and respond via the wire to the battery and the claws are 
quite small. I don’t know whether there are claws or not and if there 
aren’t claws there are sort of projections off the side of each electrode 
little bumps. 
Little sensors? 
Yes little markers but this is pure fantasy I don’t think it’s true, and then 
I imagine green and red wire going down attached to these two 
electrodes I’m not quite sure how they’re attached because the end of 
the electrode is in the brain so how can you get the wire there very odd 
and it’s very like an extremely big kitchen wire with two plaited red and 
green conduits which go in to a battery which is a normal Duracell 
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battery in my bosom that’s how I imagine it, my battery says Duracell 
on it. (3) 
 
Uncertainty and fear predominated: 
 
Something had happened to my brain, they put two metal rods in it and 
I wasn’t sure what this meant I was going to be like. (2) 
 
I felt my brain had been taken over and God knows what thoughts had 
been put in it and would I ever be in control of it again and would I 
know how to handle my new brain. (2) 
 
Although Katherine did not believe literally that she had a new brain, she 
expressed repeated concerns about how the brain is the “centre of thought” 
and that “one feels under threat monkeying around with one’s brain”. She 
likened the brain to the heart and imagined that “if one had something done to 
one’s heart one would have the same feeling”.  
 
Katherine utilized avoidance and rational deliberation to aid adjustment: 
 
It doesn’t really impinge very much, that’s the interesting thing, there 
are days go by when I don’t give it a thought, it’s become part of me 
and it doesn’t seem so evil to have these things in my brain and I can 
trace the course of the wire into my battery. It’s funny I don’t know why 
it frightened me when you asked about it perhaps I try not to think 
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about it. I think I do try not to dwell on it because you could go fairly 
crazy trying to think about having sticks in your head but then I’ve got 
two artificial hips and an artificial knee so why am I not worrying about 
that it’s the same intrusion and it’s artificial. (3) 
 
She started to accept her “new reality” and being at home began to repair a 
usually taken-for-granted harmony: 
 
Surrounded by my own things I don’t feel that estranged I don’t feel 
that sort of different. (3) 
 
There are days go by when I don’t give it a thought, it’s become part of 
me and it doesn’t seem so evil to have these things in my brain and I 
can trace the course of the wire into my battery. (3) 
 
The experience of having DBS was a disruptive experience. The seamless 
connection of being an embodied situated person in the world had loosened, 
as if Katherine had lost the accustomed moorings which ground her. 
Phenomenologically speaking, her way of Being-in-the-world had shifted, a 
concept which captures how we are situated in the world as temporal, spatial, 
embodied and relational beings that strive inexorably to make the world 






This study has illuminated how the DBS experience is one of considerable 
emotional and cognitive turmoil. We extend our analysis by focusing on some 
of the key findings through an engagement with phenomenological and health 
psychology theories.  
 
Katherine’s emotions and feelings were clearly an important part of her 
thinking illustrating how our emotional and cognitive lives do not exist as 
separate entities, divorced from each other, but rather “as two aspects of a 
single, unified experience” (Furtek, 2010, p. 58).  Emotions, moods and 
feelings are “the other side of cognition” and they are the “indispensable 
ingredients of thought, judgment and evaluation.” (Slaby, 2010).  
 
Support for this view comes from work which finds an active role for emotions 
in decision-making which is dissimilar from more reasoned consideration (e.g. 
Heilman, Crişan, Houser, Miclea & Miu, 2010; Simon, 1956, 1957). When 
individuals process information they have access to both an intuitive 
automatic mode which is “fast, affective, parallel, associative and holistic” and 
a more reflective deliberative one which is “slower, sequential, rule-based and 
analytic” (Usher, Russo, Weyers, Brauner & Zakay, 2011). We suggest that 
Katherine engaged in both types of thinking which has implications for 
communication between clinicians and patients and future intervention 
development. The information model of communication assumes a 
relationship of clinician-as-expert which enables the patient-as-consumer to 
make the best choice. This model assumes a straightforward connection 
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between values and facts; health care professionals provide the facts and 
patients values define the treatment given. In contrast, more deliberative or 
concordance models (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1992; Wirtx, Crib & Barber, 2006) 
emphasize communication as a human and moral dialogue and that the 
beliefs, values and desires of the patient are both emotionally imbued and 
relevant. Katherine’s thinking and decision making is not “detached reflection” 
(Minger, 2001) but lived sense-making (Inkpin, 2016) which necessitates a 
careful consideration of the first-person perspective. 
 
Phenomenologically, emotional experiences disclose and open up the world 
to us, situating us in an “affective space” (Fuchs, 2013) imbuing our world with 
meaning. Through these experiences we understand what matters to us and 
we use this knowledge to guide our choices: “Acting is only possible in a world 
of affective affordances which lend a meaningful structure to the field of 
possible action.” (Fuchs, 2013). Katherine’s emotions and feelings attune her 
to the world and reveal its possibilities for actions.  
 
Whilst recognizing the range of emotions and feelings Katherine experienced, 
we propose that her fundamental orientation to the world is one of fearfulness. 
The intentional object of her fear is the DBS procedure because she judges it 
to be potentially harmful. However, Katherine not only feels fear, she 
becomes fearful, an attunement which is not simply concerned with the object, 
but has developed into something more pervasive and fundamental, akin to 
anxiety. Her fear is a “terrifying presence” (Ricoeur, 1966, p. 271) because it 
confronts her with the possibility of death and the fragility of her existence 
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(Heidegger, 1962). Katherine contains this fear by committing to surgery, 
accepting her decision and thus transcending the situation through choice and 
action.  
 
In other DBS studies patients have described themselves as feeling like 
“Robocop” or an “electronic doll” after the surgery (Agid et al, 2006). Similarly, 
Katherine was afraid and anxious about the impact of this relatively new 
procedure and the “reality” of her changed body was difficult to contemplate. 
In contrast to theories of embodiment predicated on either biological 
materialism or cultural determinism (Davis & Walker, 2008), phenomenology 
dissolves dualist notions insisting on a unified body-self-world system and 
arguing that we are body-subjects rather than body-as-object for me-as-
subject. Thus embodiment means that we do not have bodies, rather we live 
through our bodies and it is through them that we understand the world 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945; Toombs, 1995). Katherine’s imaginative descriptions of 
the neurostimulator and electrodes invoke a sense of “unhomelikeness”; 
(Svenaeus, 2011) a sense of ‘not feeling like oneself’, of being off-kilter and 
that one’s body has taken on alien qualities. Katherine’s surgery has not only 
disrupted the mood of a familiar body to one of unsettled attunement but has 
fractured the narrative and meaning-structure of her life (Ferguson, 2012; 
Kayali & Iqbal, 2013).  Katherine needs help to understand her new body and 
to regain a more homelike attunement.  
 
Previous studies are agreed about the importance of good information, 
psychological guidance and familial support when individuals face the decision 
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whether or not to have DBS. However, what constitutes ‘good’ information 
depends, at least in part, on one’s vantage point. Katherine was given ample 
factual information which she largely discarded; she wanted the opportunity to 
discuss her concerns and have them taken seriously but what she described as 
“silly” questions went unasked. Active encouragement to discuss such issues is 
necessary for people to make better informed decisions and dispel 
misperceptions as well as encourage understanding of the meaning such 
questions have for them. This requires those involved in their care to step 
outside of their professional role, no matter how briefly, and see how it looks 
from the perspective of someone like Katherine. A mutually respectful dialogue 
predicated on a “knowledge for care” and humanizing framework (Todres, 
Galvin & Hollway, 2009) is one way to address these issues. This is no easy 
task; even well-intentioned health care professionals determine the rules of 
encounter and participatory decision-making and concordance is not yet a 
reality (Borg Xeureb, Shaw & Lane, 2016). 
 
In line with previous studies, Katherine’s experience highlights the importance 
of patient tailored discussion, counselling and emotional support; highly 
desirable needs but not always realistic or practicable. One possibility is a 
‘buddy’ support system where a nurse specialist and/or psychologist matches 
prospective patients with those who have had DBS. This is similar to women 
with breast cancer who receive one-on-one peer support from breast cancer 
survivors (Ashbury, Cameron, Mercer, Fitch & Nielsen, 1998). Alternatively, 
there are interactive computer-based systems such as CHESS 
(Comprehensive Health Enhancement Support System) designed to meet 
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information, social support and problem solving needs (Gustafson, Hawkins, 
Pingree, McTavish, Arora et al, 2001). Whatever form support takes, it seems 
clear that it needs to be on-going and run alongside the entire illness/treatment 
trajectory of the person (Hathaway, 1986; Mazor et al, 2007). 
 
This study has illustrated the value of the case study and a phenomenological 
approach in health psychology research. Nevertheless, like all approaches, 
they offer a necessarily partial perspective. A case study can be seen as a 
starting point from which to develop multiple lines of research and theory. For 
example, carrying out further cases which can be compared to one another in 




This study has contributed to the small body of literature on the impact of 
having DBS surgery. It provides an exemplar of how the case study can add 
to the diverse methodological tool kit for health psychology. Its idiographic 
focus elucidated the complexity of decision–making, the emotional landscape 
and specific bodily nature of this experience. Theoretically, it has utilized 
phenomenological concepts and heath psychology research to inform 
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Table 1. Sample interview questions across the 3 interviews 
 
Questions Interview 1  Interview 2 Interview 3 
Sample How did you make 
the decision to 
have DBS?; What 
do you think the 
procedure will be 
like and how do 
you feel about it 
right now?; How do 
you think your life 
will be better after 
DBS? 
What was it like for 
you in the days 
leading up to the 
procedure?; Can 
you tell me 
everything about 
the day in as much 
detail as possible?; 
How is everything 
now? 
What has life been 
like since you 
came home?; Is life 
different in the way 
you expected it to 
be?; What advice 
and information 
would you like to 
have been given? 
Ancillary What information 
were you given?; Is 
this different to how 
you felt when you 
made the 
decision?; What 
are you hoping for? 
How did you 
prepare for it?; Did 
you talk to anyone 
in the days leading 
up to it?; What 
were you 
thinking/feeling 
before and after? 
How do you feel 
about your body 
now?; What are 
your hopes and 
expectations for 
the future?; Can 




Prompts Could you say a little more about that?; Please could you give 
me an example?; If I’ve understood you correctly, you thought 
X, is that right? 
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